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Inconsistency Robustness in Foundations: 
Mathematics self proves its own Consistency and Other 
Matters 
 
Carl Hewitt  
 
This article is dedicated to Alonzo Church, Stanisław Jaśkowski, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Ernst Zermelo. 
Abstract 
Inconsistency Robustness is performance of information systems with 
pervasively inconsistent information. Inconsistency Robustness of the 
community of professional mathematicians is their performance repeatedly 
repairing contradictions over the centuries. In the Inconsistency Robustness 
paradigm, deriving contradictions have been a progressive development and 
not “game stoppers.” Contradictions can be helpful instead of being something 
to be “swept under the rug” by denying their existence, which has been 
repeatedly attempted by Establishment Philosophers (beginning with some 
Pythagoreans). Such denial has delayed mathematical development. This 
article reports how considerations of Inconsistency Robustness have recently 
influenced the foundations of mathematics for Computer Science continuing 
a tradition developing the sociological basis for foundations.1 
 
Classical Direct Logic is a foundation of mathematics for Computer Science, 
which has a foundational theory (for convenience called “Mathematics”) that 
can be used in any other theory. A bare turnstile is used for Mathematics so 
that ├Ψ means that Ψ is a mathematical proposition that is a theorem of 
Mathematics and Φ├Ψ means that Ψ can be inferred from Φ in Mathematics. 
 
The current common understanding is that Gödel proved “Mathematics cannot 
prove its own consistency, if it is consistent.” However, the consistency of 
mathematics can be proved by a simple argument using standard rules of 
Mathematics including the following: 
 rule of Proof by Contradiction, i.e.,  (Φ⇒(ΘΘ))├ Φ 
 and the rule of Soundness, i.e., (├ Φ)⇒Φ 
Formal Proof. By definition,  
Consistent⇔∃[Ψ:Proposition]→├ (ΨΨ). By Existential Elimination, 
there is some proposition Ψ0 such that Consistent ⇒├ (Ψ0 Ψ0) which 
by Soundness and transitivity of implication means 
Consistent⇒(Ψ0Ψ0). Substituting for Φ and Θ, in the rule for Proof 
by Contradiction, it follows that (Consistent⇒(Ψ0 Ψ0))├ Consistent.   
Thus, ├ Consistent. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
2 
The above theorem means that consistency is deeply embedded in the 
architecture of classical mathematics. Please note the following points:  The 
above argument formally mathematically proves the theorem that 
mathematics is consistent and that it is not a premise of the theorem that 
mathematics is consistent. Classical mathematics was designed for 
consistent axioms and consequently the rules of classical mathematics can be 
used to prove consistency regardless of the axioms, e.g., Euclidean geometry. 
 
The above proof means that “Mathematics is consistent” is a theorem in 
Classical Direct Logic. This means that the usefulness of Classical Direct 
Logic depends crucially on the consistency of Mathematics. Good evidence 
for the consistency of Mathematics comes from the way that Classical Direct 
Logic avoids the known paradoxes. Humans have spent millennia devising 
paradoxes. 
 
Having a powerful system like Direct Logic is important in computer science 
because computers must be able to formalize all logical inferences (including 
inferences about their own inference processes) without requiring recourse to 
human intervention. Any inconsistency in Classical Direct Logic would be a 
potential security hole because it could be used to cause computer systems to 
adopt invalid conclusions. 
 
The recently developed self-proof of consistency (above) shows that the 
current common understanding that Gödel proved “Mathematics cannot 
prove its own consistency, if it is consistent” is inaccurate.i  
 
Wittgenstein long ago showed that contradiction in mathematics results from 
the kind of “self-referential”ii sentence that Gödel used in his argument that 
Mathematics cannot prove its own consistency. However, using a typed 
grammar for mathematical sentences, it can be proved that the kind “self-
referential” sentence that Gödel used in his argument cannot be constructed 
because the required fixed point that Gödel  used to construct the “self-
referential” sentence does not exist. In this way, consistency of mathematics 
is preserved without giving up power.2  
 
 
                                                          
i Four years after Gödel published his results for Principia Mathematica, [Church 
1935, Turing 1936] published the first valid proof that the mathematical theory 
Principia is inferentially undecidable (i.e. there is a proposition Ψ such that 
⊬
Principia
Ψ and ⊬
Principia
Ψ) because provability in Principia is 
computationally undecidable (provided that the theory Principia is consistent). 
ii There seem to be no practical uses for “self-referential” propositions in the 
mathematical foundations of Computer Science. 
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Mathematical Foundation for Computer Science 
 
Computer Science brought different concerns and a new perspective to 
mathematical foundations including the following requirements:3 [Arabic 
numeral superscripts refer to endnotes at the end of this article] 
 
 provide powerful inference machinery so that arguments (proofs) can be 
short and understandable and all logical inferences can be formalized 
 establish standard foundations so people can join forces and develop 
common techniques and technology 
 incorporate axioms thought to be consistent by the overwhelming 
consensus of working professional mathematicians, e.g., natural numbers 
[Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889], real numbers [Dedekind 1888], sets of sets 
of integers, real, strings, etc. 
 facilitate inferences about the mathematical foundations used by computer 
systems. 
 
Classical Direct Logic is a foundation of mathematics for Computer Science, 
which has a foundational theory (for convenience called “Mathematics”) that 
can be used in any other theory. A bare turnstile is used for Mathematics so 
that ├Ψ means that Ψ is a mathematical proposition that is a theorem of 
Mathematics and Φ├Ψ means that Ψ can be inferred from Φ in Mathematics. 
 
Mathematics self proves its own consistency 
A mathematically significant idea involves: 
“…a very high degree of unexpectedness, combined with 
inevitability and economy.” [Hardy 1940] 
 
The following rules are fundamental to classical mathematics: 
 Proof by Contradiction, i.e. (Φ⇒(ΘΘ))├ Φ, which says that a 
proposition can be proved by showing that it implies a contradiction. 
 Soundness, i.e. (├ Φ)⇒Φ, which says that a theorem can be used in a 
proof.4  
 
Theorem:  Mathematics self proves its own consistency.5 
Formal Proof 6 By definition, 
Consistent⇔∃ [Ψ:Proposition]→├ (ΨΨ).7 By the rule of 
Existential Elimination, there is some proposition Ψ0 such that 
Consistent ⇒├ (Ψ0 Ψ0) which by the rule of Soundness and 
transitivity of implication means Consistent⇒ (Ψ0 Ψ0). Substituting 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
4 
for Φ and Θ, in the rule for Proof by Contradiction, we have  
(Consistent⇒(Ψ0Ψ0))├ Consistent.  Thus,├ Consistent. 
 
A Natural Deductioni proof is given below: 
1) Consistent  // hypothesis to derive a contradiction just in this subargument
├ Consistent                                            // rule of Proof by Contradiction using 1) and 4)
 
2) ∃[Ψ:Proposition]→├(ΨΨ)       // definition of inconsistency using 1)
 
3)├(Ψ0Ψ0)                                          // rule of Existential Elimination using 2)
  
4) Ψ0Ψ0                                                                       // rule of Soundness using 3)
  
        
Natural Deduction Proof of Consistency of Mathematics 
  
                                                          
i [Jaśkowski 1934] developed Natural Deduction cf. [Barker-Plummer, Barwise, and 
Etchemendy 2011] 
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Please note the following points:   
 The above argument formally mathematically proves that 
mathematics is consistent and that it is not a premise of the theorem 
that mathematics is consistent.8  
 Classical mathematics was designed for consistent axioms and 
consequently the rules of classical mathematics can be used to prove 
consistency regardless of other axioms.9 
 
The above proof means that “Mathematics is consistent” is a theorem in 
Classical Direct Logic. This means that the usefulness of Classical Direct 
Logic depends crucially on the consistency of Mathematics.10 Good evidence 
for the consistency of Mathematics comes from the way that Classical Direct 
Logic avoids the known paradoxes. Humans have spent millennia devising 
paradoxes. 
 
Computer Science needs very strong foundations for mathematics so that 
computer systems are not handicapped. It is important not to have 
inconsistencies in mathematical foundations of Computer Science because 
they represent security vulnerabilities. 
 
The recently developed self-proof of consistency (above) shows that the 
current common understanding that Gödel proved “Mathematics cannot prove 
its own consistency, if it is consistent” is inaccurate. But the situation is even 
more interesting because Wittgenstein more than a half-century ago showed 
that contradiction in mathematics results from the kind of “self-referential” 
sentence that Gödel used in his proof. Fortunately, using a typed grammar for 
mathematical sentences, it can be proved that the kind “self-referential” 
sentence that Gödel used in his proof cannot be constructed because required 
fixed points do not exist. Consequently, using a typed grammar, consistency 
of mathematics can be preserved without giving up power.  
 
Formal typed grammars had not yet been invented when Gödel and other 
philosophers developed the First-order Thesis that weakened the foundations 
of mathematics so that, as expressed, “self-referential” propositions do not 
infer contradiction.11 The weakened foundations (based on first-order logic) 
enabled some limited meta-mathematical theorems to be proved. However, as 
explained in this article, the weakened foundations are cumbersome, 
unnatural, and unsuitable as the mathematical foundation for Computer 
Science. 
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Monster-Barring 
 “But why accept the counterexample? ... Why should the 
theorem give way...? It is the ‘criticism’ that should retreat.... It 
is a monster, a pathological case, not a counterexample.”   
Delta, student in [Lakatos, 1976, pg. 14]. 
 
The Euler formula for polyhedra is Vertices-Edges+Faces=2, which can be 
proved in a variety of different ways.  
 
But the hollow cube below is a counterexample because Vertices-
Edges+Faces=4.  
 
 
Counterexample to Euler's Formula 
 
In the face of this counterexample, it becomes important to characterize 
polyhedra more rigorously. For example, 
 A Regular solid 
 A convex solid with polyhedral faces 
 A surface consisting of a system of polygons 
 etc. 
 
Lakatos has called this strategy “monster-barring.” 
 
Wittgenstein: “self-referential” propositions lead to inconsistency 
in mathematics 
All truth passes through three stages:  
First, it is ridiculed. 
Second, it is violently opposed. 
Third, it is accepted as being self-evident. 
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) 
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Early on, Wittgenstein correctly noted that Gödel's 
“self-referential” proposition infers inconsistency in 
mathematics:i  
Let us suppose I proveii the improvability (in 
Russell’s system) of [Gödel's “self-referential” 
propositioniii] P; [⊢⊬P where P⇔⊬ P]  
then by this proof I have proved P [⊢P]. 
    Now if this proof were one in Russell’s system 
[⊢⊢P]—I should in this case have proved at once 
that it belonged [⊢P] and did not belong [⊢P 
because P⇔⊢P] to Russell’s system. 
    But there is a contradiction here! 
 
According to [Monk 2007]:12 
Wittgenstein hoped that his work on mathematics would have a cultural 
impact, that it would threaten the attitudes that prevail in logic, mathematics 
and the philosophies of them. On this measure it has been a spectacular 
failure.  
 
Unfortunately, recognition of the worth of Wittgenstein’s work on 
mathematics came long after his death. For decades, professional work 
logicians mistakenly believed that they had been completely victorious over 
Wittgenstein. 
 
contra Gödel et. al 
“Men… think in herds …  
they only recover their senses slowly, and one by one.”  
Charles Mackay 
 
                                                          
i Wittgenstein in 1937 published in Wittgenstein 1956, p. 50e and p. 51e] 
ii Wittgenstein was granting the supposition that Gödel had proved inferential 
undecidability (sometimes called “incompleteness”) of Russell’s system, e.g., ⊢⊬
 
P. However, inferential undecidability is easy to prove using the “self-referential” 
proposition P:  
Proof. Suppose to obtain a contradiction that ⊢
 
P. Both of the following can be 
inferred:  
1) ⊢
 
⊬
 
P from the hypothesis because P⇔⊬P 
2) ⊢
 
⊢
 
P from the hypothesis by Adequacy. 
But 1) and 2) are a contradiction. Consequently, ⊢⊬
 
P follows from proof by 
contradiction. 
iii constructed using a fixed point exploiting an untyped grammar of mathematics 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 
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That mathematics self proves its own consistency contradicts the result [Gödel 
1931] using a “self-referential” propositioni that mathematics cannot prove its 
own consistency. 
 
One resolution is not to have “self-referential” propositions.ii This can be 
achieved by carefully arranging the rules using a properly constructed 
grammar so that “self-referential” propositions cannot be constructed as 
shown below.iii The basic idea is to use types [Russell 
1908, Church 1940] to construct propositions from 
other propositions so that fixed points do not exist and 
consequently cannot be used to construct “self-
referential” propositions.  
 
However, there is a crucial difference between how 
Russell used types and the method used in Direct 
Logic. Russell attempted to use types as the 
fundamental mechanism for preventing 
inconsistencies by restricting the domain of 
mathematics to object that can be described by a strict 
hierarchical type system. However, he ran into trouble 
because his type mechanism was too strict and 
prevented ordinary mathematical reasoning.iv  
 
In this paper, types are used to prevent the construction of “self-referential” 
sentences and to provide the foundations for sets. The difficulties encountered 
by Russell are avoided as follows: 
 having integers13 as primitive 
 constructing sets from the characteristic functions of typed functions 
 types are used to resolve the usual paradoxes with sets, e.g., there is no 
set of all sets, etc.14 
 
  
                                                          
i constructed using a fixed point operator exploiting an untyped grammar for sentences 
ii There do not seem to be any practical uses of “self-referential” propositions in the 
mathematical foundations of Computer Science. 
iii It is important to note that disallowing “self-referential” propositions does not place 
restrictions on recursion in computation, e.g., the Actor Model, untyped lambda 
calculus, etc. 
iv In order to be able to carry out ordinary mathematical reasoning, Russell introduced 
an (unmotivated) patch called “ramified types” that collapsed the type hierarchy. 
 
Bertrand Russell 
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The above approach provides a very usable foundation for ordinary 
mathematical reasoning. Combining types and sets as the foundation has the 
advantage of using the strengths of each without the limitations of trying to 
use just one because each can be used to make up for the limitations of the 
other. The key idea is compositionality, i.e., composing new entities from 
others. Types can be composed from other types and sets can be composed 
from other sets.i 
 
Classical Direct Logic 
 
I suspect there are few today who share ... [the] belief that there 
should be a single overarching theory embracing all of mathematics.  
[Dowson 2006] 
 
Classical Direct Logic must meet the following challenges: 
 Consistent to avoid security holes 
 Powerful so that computer systems can formalize all logical inferences 
 Principled so that it can be easily learned by software engineers 
 Coherent so that it hangs together without a lot of edge cases 
 Intuitive so that humans can follow computer system reasoning 
 Comprehensive to accommodate all forms of logical argumentation 
 Inconsistency Robust to be applicable to pervasively inconsistent theories 
of practice with 
o Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic for logical inference about 
inconsistent information 
o Classical Direct Logic for Mathematics used in inconsistency-robust 
theories 
 
In Direct Logic, unrestricted recursion is allowed in programs by using 
recursive definitions. 
 
  
                                                          
i Compositionality avoids standard foundational paradoxes. For example, Direct 
Logic composes sentences from others using types so there are no “self-referential” 
propositions. 
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There are uncountably many Actors.15 For example, Real∎[ ] can output any 
real numberi between 0 and 1 whereii     
          Real∎[ ] ≡ [(0 either 1), ⩛Postpone Real∎[ ]] 
              where 
 Real∎[ ] is the result of sending the Actor Real the message [ ] 
 (0 either 1) is the nondeterministic choice of 0 or 1,  
 [ first, ⩛ rest] is the list that begins with first and whose 
remainder is rest, and 
 Postpone expression delays execution of expression until the 
value is needed. 
There are uncountably many propositions (because there is a different 
proposition for every real number). Consequently, there are propositions that 
are not the abstraction of any element of a denumerable set of sentences. For 
example, p ≡ [x:ℝ]→ ([y:ℝ]→ (y=x)) defines a different predicate p[x] for 
each real number x, which holds for only one real number, namely x.iii 
 
It is important to distinguish between strings, sentences, and propositions. 
Some strings can be parsed into sentences (i.e. grammar tree structures), which 
can be abstracted into propositions that can be asserted. Furthermore, grammar 
terms (i.e. tree structures) can be abstracted into Actors (i.e. objects in 
mathematics). 
 
Direct Logic distinguishes between concrete sentences and abstract 
propositions.16 For example, the follow sentence is a Latin parse of the string 
“Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres.”: 
           “Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres.”
Latin
   
On the other hand, the proposition that All of Gaul is divided into three parts 
was believed by Caesar.17 
A sentence s can be abstracted ( s
T
 )18 as a proposition in a theory T. 
For example,  
    “Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres.”
Latin
 
English 
                                                           
⇾  All of Gaul is divided into three parts 
 
                                                          
i using binary representation.  
ii Typically, a result returned by the non-deterministic procedure Real is not 
computable in the sense there is no computable deterministic procedure that can 
compute its digits. 
iii For example (p[3])[y] holds if and only if y=3. 
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Also, 
    “Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres.” 
Latin
 
Spanish
   
                                          ⇾ Toda Galia está dividida en tres partes i 
 
Abstraction and parsing are becoming increasingly important in software 
engineering. e.g., 
 The execution of code can be dynamically checked against its 
documentation.  Also Web Services can be dynamically searched for 
and invoked on the basis of their documentation. 
 Use cases can be inferred by specialization of documentation and from 
code by automatic test generators and by model checking. 
 Code can be generated by inference from documentation and by 
generalization from use cases. 
 
Abstraction and parsing are needed for large software systems so that 
that documentation, use cases, and code can mutually speak about what 
has been said and their relationships. 
In mathematics: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
i Spanish for all of Gaul is divided in three parts. 
 
Proposition 
e.g.  ∀[n:ℕ]→ ∃[m:ℕ]→ m>n 
intuitively : For every number, there 
is a larger number. Sentence 
  e.g. “∀[n:ℕ]→ ∃[m:ℕ]→ m>n” 
String 
e.g. “∀[n:ℕ]→ ∃[m:ℕ]→ m>n” 
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In Direct Logic, a sentence is a grammar tree (analogous to the ones used by 
linguists). Such a grammar tree has terminals that can be constants. And there 
are uncountably many constants, e.g., the real numbers: 
The sentence 3.14159... <  3.14159... + 1 is impossible to obtain by 
parsing a string (where 3.14159... is an Actori for the  transcendental real 
number that is the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter). The 
issue is that there is no string which when parsed is  
                3.14159... <  3.14159... + 1  
Of course, because the digits of 3.14159...  are computable, there is an 
term1 such that  term1 ii = 3.14159... that can be used to create the 
sentence  term1 <  term1 + 1.  
However the sentence  term1 <  term1 + 1 is not the same as  
3.14159... <  3.14159... + 1 because it does not have the same 
vocabulary and it is a much larger sentence that has many terminals 
whereas 3.14159... <  3.14159... + 1 has just 3 terminals: 
Consequently, sentences cannot be enumerated and there are some sentences 
that cannot be obtained by parsing strings. These arrangements exclude 
known paradoxes from Classical Direct Logic.iii 
Note:  type theory of Classical Direct Logic is much stronger than 
constructive type theory with constructive logic19 because Classical 
Direct Logic has all of the power of Classical Mathematics. 
 
  
                                                          
i whose digits are incrementally computable  
ii Using abstraction on terms. See explanation below.  
iii Please see historical appendix of this article. 
                                                        < 
                                                                            + 
                                      3.14159...                     
                                                          3.14159...              1                                                                                                
 
                                                              3.14159...            1 
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Mathematics self proves that it is open 
 
Mathematics proves that it is open in the sense that it can prove that its 
theorems cannot be provably computationally enumerated:20 
   Theorem ⊢Mathematics is Open 
Proof.i Suppose to obtain a contradiction that it is possible to prove 
closure, i.e., there is a provably computable total procedure Proof such 
that it is provable that 
   ├
p
  
Ψ   ⇔  ∃ [i:ℕ]→  Proof[i]=p 
As a consequence of the above, there is a provably total procedure 
ProvableComputableTotal that enumerates the provably total 
computable procedures that can be used in the implementation of the 
following procedure: 
      Diagonal[i] ≡  (ProvableComputableTotal[i])[i]+1 
However, 
 ProvableComputableTotal[Diagonal] because Diagonal is 
implemented using provably computable total procedures. 
 ProvableComputableTotal[Diagonal] because Diagonal is a 
provably computable total procedure that differs from every other 
provably computable total procedure. 
The above contradiction completes the proof. 
 
[Franzén 2004] argued that mathematics is inexhaustible because of 
inferential undecidabilityii of mathematical theories. The above theorem that 
mathematics is open provides another independent argument for the 
inexhaustibility of mathematics. 
 
Completeness of inference versus inferential undecidability of 
closed mathematical theories 
 
A closed mathematical theory is an extension of mathematics whose proofs 
are computationally enumerable. For example, group theory is obtained by 
adding the axioms of groups to Classical Direct Logic along with the axiom 
that theorems of group theory are computationally enumerable. 
 
By definition, if T is a closed theory, there is a total procedure ProofT such 
that ├
p
T 
Ψ ⇔ ∃ [i:ℕ]→ ProofT[i]=p 
                                                          
i This argument appeared in [Church 1934] expressing concern that the argument 
meant that there is “no sound basis for supposing that there is such a thing as logic.” 
ii See section immediately below. 
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Theorem:i If T is a consistent, closed mathematical theory, there is a 
proposition ChurchTuring
T
 such that both of the following hold:ii 
 ⊢⊬
T
 ChurchTuring
T
 
 ⊢⊬
T
 ChurchTuring
T
 
 
  
                                                          
i First stated in [Gödel 1931]. 
ii Proof [Church 1935, Turing 1936] (This proof is a replacement for the incorrect 
proof in [Gödel 1931]): 
       Otherwise, provability in classical logic would be computationally decidable 
because 
       ∀[p:Program, x:ℕ]→ Halt[p, x] ⇔ ⊢ Halt[p, x] 
where Halt[p, x] if and only if program p halts on input x.  If such a ChurchTuring did 
not exist, then provability could be decided by enumerating theorems until the 
proposition in question or its negation is encountered. 
    Note the following important ingredients for the proof of inferential undecidability 
of a consistent, closed mathematical theory: 
 Closure (computational enumerability) of theorems of a mathematical theory 
to carry through the proof. 
 Consistency (nontriviality) to prevent everything from being provable 
Alonzo Church 
 
Alan Turing 
 
Ernst Zermelo 
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Corollary: There is a proposition Φ of ℕ such that the following hold:21 
 ⊢⊨ℕΦ 
 ⊢⊬ℕΦ 
 
Proof. i  Since ℕ is consistent, one of the following two cases hold: 
1. ⊨ℕΨChurchTuring: choose Φ to be ChurchTuringℕ 
2. ⊨ℕ ΨChurchTuring: choose Φ to be ChurchTuringℕ 
 
Information Invarianceii is a fundamental technical goal of logic consisting of 
the following: 
1. Soundness of inference: information is not increased by inferenceiii 
2. Completeness of inference: all information that necessarily holds can be 
inferred 
 
Note that a closed mathematical theory
 
T is inferentially undecidableiv with 
respect to ChurchTuring
T
 does not mean incompleteness with respect to the 
information that can be inferred about theory T because ⊢(⊬
T
 
ChurchTuring
T
), (⊬
T ChurchTuringT).
22 
 
Overview 
 
Contradiction Outcome 
 
Church discovered to his dismay that 
if theorems of mathematics are 
postulated to be computationally 
enumerable, then mathematics is 
inconsistent. 
Theorems of mathematics cannot 
be computationally enumerated 
and mathematics is open and 
inexhaustible. But theorems of a 
particular theory can be postulated 
to be computationally enumerable.  
  
                                                          
i This proof is a replacement for the invalid proof in [Gödel 1931]. 
ii Closely related to conservation laws in physics  
iii E.g. inconsistent information does not infer nonsense. 
iv sometimes called “incomplete” 
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Using fixed points to construct a 
“self-referential” sentence for an 
untyped grammar of mathematical 
sentences, [Gödel 1931] claimed that 
mathematics cannot prove its own 
consistency.  However, it is pointed 
out in this paper that mathematics 
easily proves its own consistency. 
 
The contradiction can be resolved 
by using a properly-typed grammar 
for sentences of mathematics does 
not allow the use of fixed points to 
construct “self-referential” 
sentences.i 
Using fixed points to construct a 
“self-referential” sentence using an 
untyped grammar of mathematical 
sentences, [Gödel 1931] claimed to 
prove inferential undecidability 
(sometimes called “incompleteness”) 
for mathematics. However, such 
“self-referential” sentences lead to 
inconsistency in mathematics. 
 
[Church 1935, Turing 1936] proved 
inferential undecidabilty of closed 
mathematical theories without 
using fixed points for an untyped 
grammar of mathematical 
sentences to construct “self-
referential” sentences. 
In Computer Science, it is important 
that the Natural Numbers (ℕ) be 
axiomatized in a way that does not 
allow integers (e.g. infinite ones) in 
models of the axioms.  However, it is 
impossible to properly axiomatize ℕ 
using first-order logic. 
Using Classical Direct Logic, ℕ can 
be axiomatized in such a way that 
all models are uniquely isomorphic 
to ℕ [Dedekind 1888, Peano 
1889]. Consequently, there are no 
infinite integers in models of the 
axioms. 
In Computer Science, it is important 
that sets of the Natural Numbers 
(Setsℕ) be axiomatized in a way 
that does not allow countable models. 
However, it is impossible to properly 
axiomatize Setsℕ using first-order 
logic. 
Using Classical Direct Logic, 
Setsℕ are defined by 
characteristic functions of types 
and thus all models are uniquely 
isomorphic to Setsℕ. 
Consequently, its models have no 
infinite integers or other 
nonstandard elements. 
  
                                                          
i Note this does not prevent using fixed points to define recursion in programs. 
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First-order logic is unsuitable as the 
foundation of mathematics for 
Computer Science: 
 Some theorems of ordinary 
classical mathematics cannot 
be proved. 
 Some ordinary theorems 
useful in Computer Science 
cannot be proved. 
 There are undesirable models 
of mathematical theories (see 
above). 
Classical Direct Logic is suitable as 
the foundation of mathematics for 
Computer Science: 
 All ordinary theorems of 
classical mathematics can 
be proved. 
 All ordinary theorems 
useful in Computer 
Science can be proved 
 There are no undesirable 
models of mathematical 
theories. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The problem is that today some knowledge still feels too dangerous 
because our times are not so different to Cantor or Boltzmann or Gödel's 
time. We too feel things we thought were solid being challenged; feel our 
certainties slipping away. And so, as then, we still desperately want to 
cling go a belief in certainty. It makes us feel safe. ...  
    
 Are we grown up enough to live with uncertainties or will we repeat the 
mistakes of the twentieth century and pledge blind allegiance to another 
certainty.  Malone [2007]The world always needs heretics to challenge the 
prevailing orthodoxies. We are lucky that we can be heretics today without 
any danger of being burned at the stake. But unfortunately I am an old heretic. 
Old heretics do not cut much ice. When you hear an old heretic talking, you 
always say, “Too bad he has lost his marbles.”  
 
What the world needs is young heretics. I am hoping that one or two of 
you people in the audience may fill that role. 
Dyson [2005] 
 
A closed mathematical theory is an extension of mathematics whose proofs 
are computationally enumerable. For example, group theory is obtained by 
adding the axioms of groups to Classical Direct Logic along with the axioms 
that the theorems of group theory are computationally enumerable. If a closed 
mathematical theory T is consistent, then it is inferentially undecidablei 
because provability in T is computationally undecidable [Church 1935 and 
later Turing 1936]. 
 
                                                          
i i.e. there is a proposition Ψ such that ⊬
T
Ψ and  ⊬
T Ψ, which is sometimes called 
“incompleteness” 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
18 
Information Invariance is a fundamental technical goal of logic consisting of 
the following: 
1. Soundness of inference: information is not increased by inference 
2. Completeness of inference: all information that necessarily holds can be 
inferred. 
That a closed mathematical theory T is inferentially undecidablei with respect 
to Ψ (above) does not mean incompleteness with respect to the information 
that can be inferred because (by construction) 
⊢(⊬
T
Ψ), (⊬
T
 Ψ). 
 
Computer Science needs a rigorous foundation for all of mathematics that 
enables computers to carry out all reasoning without human intervention.23 
[Frege 1879] was a good start, but it foundered on the issue of being well-
founded. [Russell 1925] attempted basing foundations entirely on types, but 
foundered on the issue of being expressive enough to carry to some common 
mathematical reasoning. [Church 1932, 1933] attempted basing foundations 
entirely on untyped higher-order functions, but foundered because it allowed 
“self-referential” propositions leading to contradictions [Kleene and Rosser 
1935]. Presently, Isabelle [Paulson 1989] and Coq [Coquand and Huet 1986] 
are founded on types and do not allow theories to reason about themselves. 
Classical Direct Logic is a foundation for all of mathematical reasoning based 
on both sets (for well-founded structures) and types (to provide expressibility 
for concepts including a grammar for propositions) that allows general 
inference about reasoning. 
 
[Gödel 1931] claimed inferential undecidabilityii results for Principia 
Mathematica as the foundation of all of mathematics using a “self-referential” 
proposition constructed using fixed points exploiting a untyped grammar of 
mathematical sentences. In opposition to Wittgenstein's correct argument that 
“self-referential” propositions lead to contradictions in mathematics, Gödel 
later claimed that his results were for a cut-down first-order theory of Peano 
numbers. However, first-order logic is not a suitable foundation for Computer 
Science because of the requirement that computer systems be able to carry out 
all reasoning without requiring human intervention (including reasoning about 
their own inference systems). Following [Frege 1879, Russell 1925, and 
Church 1932-1933], Direct Logic was developed and then investigated “self-
referential” propositions with the following results. 
 Formalization of Wittgenstein's proof that Gödel's “self-referential” 
proposition leads to contradiction in mathematics. So the consistency of 
mathematics had to be rescued against Gödel's “self-referential” 
                                                          
i sometimes called “incomplete” 
ii sometimes called “incompleteness” 
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propositions. The “self-referential” proposition used in results of [Curry 
1941] and [Löb 1955] also lead to inconsistency in mathematics. 
Consequently, mathematics had to be rescued against these “self-
referential” propositions as well. 
 Self-proof of the consistency of mathematics. Consequently, 
mathematics had to be rescued against the claim [Gödel 1931] that 
mathematics cannot prove its own consistency. Also, it became an open 
problem whether mathematics proves its own consistency, which was 
resolved by the author discovering an amazing simple proof. 24 
A solution is to bar “self-referential” propositions using a properly 
constructed grammar for sentences of mathematics.25 However, 
Establishment Philosophers have very reluctant to accept the solution.  
According to [Dawson 2006]:26 
 Gödel’s results altered the mathematical landscape, but they did not 
“produce a debacle”. 
 There is less controversy today over mathematical foundations than 
there was before Gödel’s work. 
However, Gödel’s results have produced a controversy of a very different 
kind from the one discussed by Dawson: 
 Gödel's result that mathematics cannot prove its own consistencyi 
has been disproved. 
 Consequently, Gödel's results have led to increased controversy over 
mathematical foundations. 
 
The development of Direct Logic has strengthened the position of working 
mathematicians as follows:ii 
 Allowing freedom from the philosophical dogma of the First-Order 
Thesis 
 Providing a usable type theory for all of Mathematics 
 Allowing theories to freely reason about theories 
 Providing Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic for safely reasoning about 
theories of practice that are (of necessity) pervasively inconsistent. 
 
  
                                                          
i Gödel's result was accepted doctrine by Establishment Philosophers for over eight 
decades 
ii Of course, Direct Logic must preserve as much previous learning as possible. 
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Appendix 1. Notation of Classical Direct Logic 
 
Types and Propositions are defined as follows: 
• Types  
• Boolean,ℕ27,Sentence,Proposition,Proof,Theory:Type 
• If σ1,σ2:Type, then σ1⊔σ2,[σ1, σ2]28,[σ1]↦σ2i,σ2
𝛔1 ii:Type. 
• If σ:Type, then Termσ29:Type. 
• If σ1,σ2:Type, f:σ2
𝛔1 and x:σ1, then f[x]:σ2. 
• If σ1,σ2:Type, then σ1⊔σ2, [σ1]↦σ2, σ2
𝛔1:Type 
• If σ:Type, then Termσ:Type 
 
 Propositions, i.e., x:Proposition ⇔ x constructed by the rules below: 
• If σ:Type, :Booleanσ and x:σ, then [x]:Proposition.iii 
• If :Proposition, then :Proposition. 
• If ,:Proposition, then , , ⇨, ⇔:Proposition. 
• If p:Boolean and ,:Proposition, then  
(p  � True⦂ 1, False⦂ 2):Proposition.30 
• If σ1,σ2:Type, x1:σ1 and x2:σ2, then 
x1=x2,x1x2,x1⊑x2,x1x2,x1:x2:Proposition. 
• If 1 to n :Proposition, 
then (1, …, k⊢ k+1, …, n):Proposition 31 
• If p:Proof and :Proposition, then (├
𝐩
 
 ):Propositioniv 
 
  
                                                          
i type of computable procedures from type σ1 into σ2. 
ii type of functions from σ1 into σ2 
iii [x]⇔([x]=True)   
Note that σ:Type, :Booleanσ means that there are no fixed points for 
propositions. 
iv p is a proof of  
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Grammar trees (i.e. expressions, terms, and sentences) are defined as 
follows : 
 Expressions, i.e., x:Expressionσ ⇔ x constructed by the rules 
below: 
• True,False:ConstantBoolean and 0,1:Constantℕ.  
• If σ:Type and x:Constantσ, then x:Expressionσ. 
• If σ:Type and x:Variableσ, then x:Expressionσ. 
• If σ,σ1 to n:Type, x1 to n:Expressionσ1 to n and y:Expressionσ, 
then (Let {v1 ≡ x1 , ... , vn ≡ xn}, y):Expressionσ and 
v1 to n:Variableσ1 to n in y and in each x1 to n. 
• If e1, e2:ExpressionType, then 
 e1⊔e2, [e1, e2] ,[e1]↦e2,e2
𝐞1:ExpressionType. 
• If t1:ExpressionBoolean, t2,t3:Expressionσ,  then 
 t1 � True ⦂ t2, False ⦂  t3:Expressionσ.32 
• If σ1,σ2:Type, t:Expressionσ2, then 
[x:σ1]→ t:Expression[σ1]↦σ2 and x:Variableσ1.33 
• If σ1,σ2:Type, p:Expression[σ1]↦σ2 and x:Expressionσ1, then 
p∎[x] :Expressionσ2. 
• If e:Expressionσ, then  e :Expressionσ. 
• If e:Expressionσ with no free variables and e converges, then 
e :σ. 
 
 Terms, i.e., x:Termσ ⇔ x constructed by the rules below: 
• If σ:Type and x:Constantσ, then x:Termσ. 
• If σ:Type and x:Variableσ, then x:Termσ. 
• If t1, t2:TermType,  
then t1⊔t2,[t1, t2] ,[t1]↦t2,t2
𝐭1:TermType. 
• If σ:Type, t1:TermBoolean, t2,t3:Termσ,  
then t1 � True ⦂ t2, False ⦂ t3:Termσ. 
• If σ1,σ2:Type, f:Termσ2
𝛔1 and t:Termσ1, then 
 f[t] :Termσ2. 
• If σ1,σ2:Type and t:Termσ2, then  
[x:σ1]→ t:Termσ2
𝛔1 and x:Variableσ1 in t. 
• If σ:Type and t:Termσ, then  t :Termσ. 
• If σ:Type, e:Expressionσ with no free variables and e 
converges, then e:Constantσ. 
• If σ:Type and t:Termσ with no free variables, then t :σ.  
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 Sentences, i.e., x:Sentence ⇔ x constructed by the rules below: 
• If s1:Sentence then, s1:Sentence. 
• If s1,s2:Sentence then s1s2,s1s2,s1⇨s2,s1⇔s2:Sentence. 
• If σ:Type, t1:TermBooleanσ and t2:Termσ, then 
 t1[t2] :Sentence 
• If t:TermBoolean and s1,s2:Sentence,  
then t  � True ⦂ s1, False ⦂ s2:Sentence.34 
• If σ1,σ2:Type, t1:Termσ1 and t2:Termσ2, then 
t1=t2,t1t2,t1⊑t2,t1t2,t1:t2:Sentence. 
• If σ:Type and s:Sentence, then  
∀[x:σ]→ s,∃[x:σ]→ s:Sentence and x:Variableσ in s. 
• If s1 to n:Sentence, then s1, …, sk ⊢ sk+1, …, sn:Sentence 
• If p:TermProof and s:Sentence, then ├
𝐩
  
s:Sentence 
• If s:Sentence, then  s :Sentence. 
• If s:Sentence with no free variables, then s :Proposition. 
 
Foundations with both types and sets 
Everyone is free to elaborate [their] own foundations. All that is required 
of [a] Foundation of Mathematics is that its discussion embody absolute 
rigor, transparency, philosophical coherence, and addresses 
fundamental methodological issues. 
[Nielsen 2014] 
 
Classical Direct Logic develops foundations for mathematics using bothi 
typesii and setsiii encompassing all of standard mathematics including the 
integers, reals, analysis, geometry, etc.35 
 
Combining types and sets as the foundation has the advantage of using the 
strengths of each without the limitations of trying to use just one because each 
can be used to make up for the limitations of the other. The key idea is 
                                                          
i Past attempts to reduce mathematics to logic alone, to sets alone, or to types alone 
have not be very successful. 
ii According to [Scott 1967]: “there is only one satisfactory way of avoiding the 
paradoxes: namely, the use of some form of the theory of types... the best way to 
regard Zermelo's theory is as a simplification and extension of Russell's ...simple 
theory of types. Now Russell made his types explicit in his notation and Zermelo 
left them implicit. It is a mistake to leave something so important invisible...” 
iii According to [Scott 1967]:  “As long as an idealistic manner of speaking about 
abstract objects is popular in mathematics, people will speak about collections of 
objects, and then collections of collections of ... of collections. In other words set 
theory is inevitable.” [emphasis in original] 
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compositionality, i.e., composing new entities from others. Types can be 
composed from other types and sets can be composed from other sets. 
 
Functions, graphs, and lists are fundamental to the mathematical foundations 
of Computer Science. SetFunctionsσ (type of set functions based on type 
σ) that can be defined inductively as follows: 
    SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[1] ≡ σσ 
    SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[n+1] ≡  
                             (σ⊔SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[n])σ⊔SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[n] 
Furthermore the process of constructing orders of 
SetFunctionsOfOrderσis exhaustive for SetFunctionsσ:i 
     SetFunctionsσ≡ ∐  i:ℕ  SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[i] 
 
Sets (along with lists) provide a convenient way to collect together elements.36 
For example, sets (of sets of sets of ...) of σ can be axiomatized as follows:ii 
   ∀[s:Setsσ]→ ∃[f:SetFunctionsσ]→ CharacteristicFunction[f, s] 
       where ∀[s:Setsσ, f:BooleanSetFunctionsσ]→   
                    CharacteristicFunction[f, s] 
                                                            ⇔ ∀[e:σ⊔Setsσ]→  es  ⇔ f[e]=True 
       i.e. every set of type Setsσ is defined by a characteristic 
      function of SetFunctionsσ 
 
Note that there is no set corresponding to the type Setsℕwhich is an 
example of how types extend the capabilities of sets.37 
 
Although Setsℕ are well-founded38, in general sets in Direct Logic are not 
well-founded. For example, consider the following definition: 
              InfinitelyDeep∎[ ] ≡ {postpone InfinitelyDeep∎[ ]}iii 
Consequently, InfinitelyDeep∎[ ]InfinitelyDeep∎[ ]. 
 
                                                          
i The closure property below is used to guarantee that there is just one model of 
SetFunctionsℕ up to isomorphism using a unique isomorphism.  
ii Of course, the higher cardinals are left out of these foundations. On the other hand, 
Computer Science doesn’t need higher cardinals in its mathematical foundations. 
iii InfinitelyDeep∎[ ] = {{{{{...}}}} 
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Natural Numbers, Real Numbers, and their Sets are Unique up to 
Isomorphismi 
The following question arises: What mathematics have 
been captured in the above foundations? 
 
Theoremii (Categoricity of ℕ):39  
∀[M:Modelℕ]→ M≈ℕ, i.e., models of the natural 
numbers ℕ are isomorphic by a unique isomorphism.iii 
 
The following strong induction axiom40 can be used to 
characterize the natural numbers (ℕ41) up to isomorphism with a unique 
isomorphism: 
 ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→  Inductive[P]⇨ ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i]  
      where  ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→ Inductive[P] 
                                                                        ⇔ (P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i] ⇨P[i+1])42 
 
Theoremiv (Categoricity of ℝ):43  
∀[M:Modelℝ]→ M≈ℝ, i.e., models of the 
real numbers ℝ are isomorphic by a unique 
isomorphism.v 
 
The following can be used to characterize the real 
numbers (ℝ44) up to isomorphism with a unique 
isomorphism: 
 
∀[S:Setℝ]→  S≠{ }  Bounded[S] ⇨ HasLeastUpperBound[S] 
 where   
    Bounded[S:Setℝ] ⇔ ∃[b:ℝ]→ UpperBound[b, S]  
    UpperBound[b:ℝ, S:Setℝ] ⇔  bS  ∀[xS]→ x≦b 
    HasLeastUpperBound[S:Setℝ]]  ⇔ ∃[b:ℝ]→ LeastUpperBound[b, S] 
    LeastUpperBound[b:ℝ, S:Setℝ] 
                              ⇔  UpperBound[b,S]  ∀[xS]→ UpperBound[x,S] ⇨ x≦b 
 
                                                          
i and the isomorphism is unique 
ii [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889] 
iii Consequently, the type of natural numbers ℕ is unique up to isomorphism and the 
type of reals ℝ is unique up to isomorphism. 
iv [Dedekind 1888] 
v Consequently, the type of natural numbers ℕ is unique up to isomorphism and is a 
subtype of reals ℝ that is unique up to isomorphism. 
Giuseppe Peano 
Richard Dedekind 
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Theorem (Categoricity of  Setsℕ⊔ℝ):45  
∀[M:ModelSetsℕ⊔ℝ]→ M≈Setsℕ⊔ℝ, i.e., 
models of Setsℕ⊔ℝ are isomorphic by a unique 
isomorphism.i 
 
Setsℕ⊔ℝ (which is a fundamental type of 
mathematics) is exactly characterized axiomatically, 
which is what is required for Computer Science. 
 
Proof: By above, ∀[M:Modelℕ]→ M≈ℕ, i.e., models 
of ℕ are isomorphic by a unique isomorphism. Unique isomorphism of higher 
order sets can be proved using induction from the following closure property 
for SetFunctions (see above): 
          SetFunctionsℕ⊔ℝ≡ ∐  i:ℕ SetFunctionsOfOrderℕ⊔ℝ[i] 
Unique isomorphism for SetFunctionsℕ⊔ℝ can be extended to 
Setsℕ⊔ℝ because every set in Setsℕ⊔ℝ is defined by a characteristic 
function of SetFunctionsℕ⊔ℝ. (See above) 
 
Classical Direct Logic is much stronger than first-order axiomatizations of set 
theory.46 
 
Theorem (Set Theory Model Soundness): (⊢Setsℕ) ⇨ ⊨Setsℕ 
Proof: Suppose ⊢Setsℕ. The conclusion immediately follows because the 
axioms for the theory Setsℕ hold in the model Setsℕ . 
  
                                                          
i Consequently, the type of natural numbers ℕ is unique up to isomorphism and the 
type of reals ℝ is unique up to isomorphism. 
Ernst Zermelo 
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Appendix 2. Historical Background 
The powerful (try to) insist that their statements are literal 
depictions of a single reality. ‘It really is that way’, they tell us. 
‘There is no alternative.’ But those on the receiving end of such 
homilies learn to read them allegorically, these are techniques 
used by subordinates to read through the words of the powerful 
to the concealed realities that have produced them. 
Law [2004] 
 
Gödel was certain 
“Certainty” is far from being a sign of success; it 
is only a symptom of lack of imagination and 
conceptual poverty. It produces smug satisfaction 
and prevents the growth of knowledge.  
[Lakatos 1976] 
Paul Cohen [2006] wrote as follows of his interaction with 
Gödel:  
His [Gödel's] main interest seemed to lie in discussing 
the “truth” or “falsity” of these questions, not merely 
in their undecidability. He struck me as having an 
almost unshakable belief in this “realist” position, which I found difficult 
to share. His ideas were grounded in a deep philosophical belief as to what 
the human mind could achieve. I greatly admired this faith in the power 
and beauty of Western Culture, as he put it, and would have liked to 
understand more deeply what were the sources of his strongly held beliefs. 
Through our discussions, I came closer to his point of view, although I 
never shared completely his “realist” point of view, that all questions of 
Set Theory were in the final analysis, either true or false.  
 
Chaitin [2007] presented the following analysis: 
Gödel’s proof of inferential undecidability [incompleteness] was too 
superficial. It didn't get at the real heart of what was going on. It was more 
tantalizing than anything else. It was not a good reason for something so 
devastating and fundamental. It was too clever by half. It was too 
superficial. [It was based on the clever construction] “I'm unprovable.” So 
what? This doesn't give any insight how serious the problem is. 
 
After Church[1935] and Turing[1936] proved inferential undecidabilty of 
closed mathematical theories using computational undecidablityi, Gödel 
                                                          
i See proof of inferential undecidablity of closed mathematical theories elsewhere in 
this article. 
Kurt Gödel 
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claimed more generality and that his results applied to all consistent 
mathematical systems that incorporate Peano axioms. However, when he 
learned of Wittgenstein's devastating proof of inconsistency, 47 Gödel retreated 
to claiming that his results applied to the very weak system of first-order 
Peano.48 The upshot is that Gödel never acknowledged that his “self-
referential” propositioni implies inconsistency in mathematics. See further 
discussion below in this article. 
 
Also, the ultimate criteria for correctness in the theory of natural numbers is 
provability using strong induction [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889]. In this sense, 
Wittgenstein was correct in his identification of “truth” with provability. On 
the other hand, Gödel obfuscated the important identification of provability as 
the touchstone of ultimate correctness in mathematics. 
 
von Neumann [1961] had a very different view from 
Gödel: 
  
It is not necessarily true that the mathematical 
method is something absolute, which was 
revealed from on high, or which somehow, after 
we got hold of it, was evidently right and has 
stayed evidently right ever since. 
 
Limitations of first-order logic 
By this it appears how necessary it is for nay man that aspires to true 
knowledge to examine the definitions of former authors; and either to 
correct them, where they are negligently set down, or to make them 
himself.  For the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as 
the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last 
they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning; 
in which lies the foundation of their errors... 
[Hobbes Leviathan, Chapter 4]49 
 
It is very important not to confuse Mathematics with first-order logic, which 
was invented by philosophers for their own purposes. It turns out that first-
order logic is amazing weak. For example, first-order logic is incapable of 
characterizing even the Peano numbers, i.e., there are infinite integers in 
models of every first-order axiomatization of the Peano numbers. 
Furthermore, there are infinitesimal real numbers  in models of every first-
                                                          
i constructed using fixed points exploiting an untyped grammar of mathematics 
John von Neumann 
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order axiomatization of the real numbers.i Of course, infinite integers and 
infinitesimal reals are monsters that must be banned from the mathematical 
foundations of Computer Science. 
 
However, some philosophers have found first-order logic to be useful for their 
careers because it is weak enough that they can prove theorems about first-
order axiomatizations whereas they cannot prove such theorems about 
stronger practical systems, e.g., Classical Direct Logic. For example, there is 
a famous theorem that first-order set theory is too weak to decide 
ContinuumHypothesis50, i.e., ⊬FirstOrderSetAxiomsContinuumHypothesis and 
⊬FirstOrderSetAxiomsContinuumHypothesis.51 However, ContinuumHypothesis 
is still an open problem in Mathematics. That ContinuumHypothesis is an 
open problem is not so important for Computer Science because for subsets 
of reals of that are computableii, the ComputationalContinuumTheoremiii 
holds.52 
 
Zermelo considered the First-Order Thesis to 
be a mathematical “hoax” because it 
necessarily allowed unintended models of 
axioms.53  
 
  
                                                          
i Likewise, first-order set theory (e.g. ZFC) is very weak. See discussion immediately 
below. 
ii A real number is computable if an only if its digits are computable. 
iii ℝ has no subset of computable reals whose cardinality is strictly between ℕ and ℝ. 
Ernst Zermelo 
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[Barwise 1985] critiqued the First-Order Thesisi as follows: 
 
The reasons for the widespread, often uncritical 
acceptance of the first-order thesis are numerous. 
The first-order thesis ... confuses the subject matter of 
logic with one of its tools. First-order language is just 
an artificial language structured to help investigate 
logic, much as a telescope is a tool constructed to 
help study heavenly bodies. From the perspective of 
the mathematics in the street, the first-order thesis is 
like the claim that astronomy is the study of the 
telescope.54 
 
Computer Science is making increasing use of Model Analysisii in the sense 
of analyzing relationships among the following: 
 concurrent programs and their Actor Model denotations 
 axiom systems and their  models 
 
Having infinite integers and infinitesimal reals in models of axioms can cause 
problems in practical Model Analysis because a computer system can easily 
prove that there are no infinite integers and no infinitesimal reals. 
Consequently, infinite integers and infinitesimal reals are modeling monsters. 
Fortunately, these modeling monsters do not exist in Classical Direct Logic. 
 
The cut-down-first-order theory FirstOrderPeanoiii is too limited for 
Computer Science because of the following: 
 (⊢
FirstOrderPeano
) ⇨ ⊢
Peano
 
 There are some 0 that are important in Computer Science (see 
immediately below) such that: 
 ⊢Peano0 
 ⊬FirstOrderPeano0 
 
In Computer Science, it is important that the Natural Numbers (ℕ) be 
axiomatized in a way that does not allow non-numbers (e.g. infinite ones) in 
models of the axioms. Unfortunately, every consistent first-order 
axiomatization of ℕ has a model with an infinite integer: 
                                                          
i The “First-Order Thesis” is that mathematical foundations should be restricted to 
first-order logic. 
ii a restricted form of Model Checking in which the properties checked are limited to 
those that can be expressed in Linear-time Temporal Logic has been studied 
[Clarke, Emerson, Sifakis, etc. ACM 2007 Turing Award]. 
iii with cut-down first-order Peano axioms 
Jon Barwise 
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Theorem: If ℕ is a model of a first-order axiomatization T, then T has a 
model M with an infinite integer. 
 
Proof:  The model M is constructed as an extension of ℕ by adding a new 
element ∞ with the following atomic relationships: 
                              {∞<∞}  (Elementwise[ [m]→ m<∞])[ℕ]i 
 It can be shown that M is a model of T with an infinite integer ∞. 
 
The infinite integer ∞ is a monster that must be banned from the 
mathematical foundations of Computer Science. 
 
A similar result holds for the standard theory ℝ of real numbers [Dedekind 
1888] compared to a cut-down, first-order theory55, which has models with 
infinitesimals: 
Theorem: If ℝ is a model of a first-order axiomatization T, then T has a 
model M with an infinitesimal. 
Proof:  The model M is constructed as an extension of ℝ by adding a 
new element ∞ with the following atomic relationships:  
                      {∞<∞}  (Elementwise[ [m]→ m<∞])[ℕ]ii  
Defining ε to be 
1
∞
 , it follows that ∀[r:ℝ]→ 0<ε<
1
𝑟
.  It can be shown 
that M is a model of T with an infinitesimal ε, which is a monster that 
must be banned from the mathematical foundations of Computer 
Science. 
 
On the other hand, since it is not limited to first-order logic, Classical Direct 
Logic characterizes structures such as natural numbers and real numbers up to 
isomorphism.iii  
 
  
                                                          
i Elementwise[f] = [s]→ {f[x] | xs} 
ii Elementwise[f] = [s]→ {f[x] | xs} 
iii proving that software developers and computer systems are using the same 
structures 
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Of greater practical import, that a computer provides service i.e.  
∃ [i:ℕ]→  ResponseBefore[i] cannot be proved in a first-order theory. 
 
Proof:  In order to obtain a contradiction, suppose that it is possible to 
prove the theorem that computer server provides servicei in a first-
order theory T.  
Therefore the following infinite set of propositions is inconsistent:ii  
             (Elementwise[ [i]→ ResponseBefore[i] ])[ℕ].  
By the compactness theorem of first-order logic, it follows that there 
is finite subset of the set of propositions that is inconsistent. But this 
is a contradiction, because all the finite subsets are consistent since 
the amount of time before a server responds is unbounded, i.e.,  
               (∄ [i:ℕ]→ ⊢
T
  ResponseBefore[i]). 
 
The above examples illustrate the following fundamental limitation of first-
order theories: 
 
In a first-order theory T, it is impossible to have both of the following for a 
predicate P: 
 ∄ [i:ℕ]→ ⊢
T
 P[i]iii 
 ⊢
T
 ∃ [i:ℕ]→ P[i] 
 
Proof:  Suppose that it is possible for both of the above to hold in a first-
order theory T. Therefore the following infinite set of propositions is 
inconsistent:56 
                 (Elementwise[ [m]→ P[m] ])[ℕ] 
By the compactness theorem of first-order logic, it follows that there is 
finite subset of the set of propositions that is inconsistent. But this is a 
contradiction, because all the finite subsets are consistent. 
 
As a foundation of mathematics for Computer Science, Classical Direct Logic 
provides categorical57 numbers (integer and real), sets, lists, trees, graphs, etc. 
which can be used in arbitrary mathematical theories including theories for 
categories, large cardinals, first-order axiomatizations, etc. These various 
theories might have “monsters” of various kinds. However, these monsters are 
not imported into the foundations of Computer Science. 
 
                                                          
i ∃ [i:ℕ]→ ResponseBefore[i] 
ii i.e. in classical notation:  { ResponseBefore[i] | i:ℕ} 
iii i.e. ∀[i:ℕ]→ ⊬
T
 P[i] 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
38 
Computer Science needs stronger systems than provided by first-order logic 
in order to weed out unwanted models. In this regard, Computer Science 
doesn’t have a problem computing with “infinite” objects (i.e. Actors) such as 
π and uncountable sets such as the real numbers ℝ.  
 
Of course some problems are theoretically not computable. However, even in 
these cases, it is often possible to compute approximations and cases of 
practical interest.i 
  
The mathematical foundation of Computer Science is very different from the 
general philosophy of mathematics in which infinite integers and infinitesimal 
reals may be of some interest. Of course, it is always possible to have special 
theories with infinite integers, infinitesimal reals, unicorns, etc. 
 
Provability Logic 
One kind of Provability Logic (called PL) is a cut-down theory of deduction 
that has been used to investigate provability predicates for languages that 
allow “self-referential” propositions [Verbrugge 2010].  
 
In Direct Logic, fixed points on propositions do not exist and consequently 
Gödel's proofs are not valid. Even in the closed theory ℕ, a “self-referential” 
sentence cannot be constructed for the following reason: 
Let SentenceFromStringWithIndexℕ be a procedure that enumerates 
sentences that can be produced by parsing mathematical strings of the closed 
theory ℕ and IndexOfSentenceFromStringℕ be a procedure that returns the 
index of a sentence that can be obtained by parsing a mathematical string. 
Gödel:Proposition ≡ SentenceFromStringWithIndexℕ∎[Fix[Diagonal]]  
    where  Diagonal∎[i:ℕ]:ℕ ≡  
         IndexOfSentenceFromStringℕ 
                    ∎[ ⊬ℕ SentenceFromStringWithIndexℕ∎[i]  ] 
 
The fixed point operator Fix cannot be defined using the strictly typed 
lambda calculus because of the following:  
   ℕtoℕ ≡ [ℕ]↦ℕ 
   Helper∎[f:ℕtoℕ]:ℕtoℕ ≡ [x:([⍰]↦ℕtoℕ])]→ f∎[x∎[x]] 
   Fix∎[f:ℕtoℕ]:ℕtoℕ ≡ (Helper∎[f])∎[Helper∎[f]] 
The missing strict type ⍰ does not exist. 
 
Because it is first-order, PL is very weak; even for proving theorems about 
integers. Also, PL makes the assumption that there are only countably many 
                                                          
i e.g. see Terminator [Knies 2006], which practically solves the halting problem for 
device drivers 
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propositions58 and that for every proposition , there is an integer 
PL
 such 
that ⇔ 
PL
 
PL
. 
 
In formulating his results, [Löb 1955] proposed the following provability 
conditions that became the basis of Provability Logic:i 
1. (⊢
PL 
) ⇨ ⊢
PL 
⊢
PL 
 
2. ⊢
PL 
 ((⊢
PL
 (⇨)) ⇨ (( ⊢
PL 
) ⇨ ⊢
PL 
))) 
3. ⊢
PL
 ((⊢
PL
 ) ⇨ ⊢
PL
 ⊢
PL
 ) 
Using “self-referential” propositions, [Löb 1955] proved the following:59  
          (⊢
PL
 ((⊢
PL
 )⇨)) ⇨ ⊢
PL
 .  
 
However, PL is a very weak theory of deduction. For example, the principle 
of natural deduction below called “Soundness” in Direct Logic that allows 
theorems to be used in subarguments is not allowed in PL:60 
(⊢ )⇨ 
 
Note that the rule of Soundness [i.e. (├ Φ)⇒Φ] does not involve any coding 
of propositions as integers. It is highly desirable for computer systems to be 
able to reason about the mathematical foundations of Classical Direct Logic 
using Classical Direct Logic. Unlike PL, Classical Direct Logic does not 
require complex circumlocutions (involving coding into integers) that obscure 
what is going on. 
 
In summary, Provability Logic (although a useful historical development step) 
is too cumbersome and fragile to serve in the mathematical foundation of 
Computer Science. 
 
  
                                                          
i His formulation actually used the convoluted coding of propositions into integers.  
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Inadequacies of Tarskian Set Models 
Tarskian Set Models61 are inadequate for foundations of Computer Science 
for they are inadequate to characterize direct inference used by systems to 
reason about their own inference capabilities.i 
 
But the most fundamental limitation of Tarskian Set Models is that large 
information theories of practice have no models because they are 
pervasively inconsistent.  
 
Church's Paradox 
 
in the case of any system of symbolic logic, the set of all provable theorems 
is [computationally] enumerable...  any system of symbolic logic not 
hopelessly inadequate ... would contain the formal theorem that this same 
system ... was either insufficient [theorems are not computationally 
enumerable] or over-sufficient [that theorems are computationally 
enumerable means that the system is inconsistent]... 
    This, of course, is a deplorable state of affairs... 
    Indeed, if there is no formalization of logic as a whole, then there is no 
exact description of what logic is, for it in the very nature of an exact 
description that it implies a formalization. And if there no exact 
description of logic, then there is no sound basis for supposing that there 
is such a thing as logic. 
[Church 1934]62 
 
[Church 1932, 1933] attempted basing foundations entirely on untyped 
higher-order functions, but foundered because contradictions emerged 
because  
1. His system allowed “self-referential” propositions [Kleene and Rosser 
1935]  
2. He believed that theorems must be computationally enumerable. 
 
Our proposal is to address the above issues as follows: 
1. Not providing for the construction of “self-referential” propositions in 
mathematics 
2. Mathematics self proves that it is “open” in the sense that theorems are 
not computationally enumerable (i.e. not “closed”).ii 
                                                          
i E.g. the theorems in this article. 
ii In other words, the paradox that concerned Church (because he thought that it could 
mean the demise of formal mathematical logic) has been transformed into 
fundamental theorem of foundations! 
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Curry and Löb Paradoxes 
An example of a “self-referential” proposition is “This proposition is not 
provable” that was used by in [Gödel 1931].63 Unfortunately, allowing 
construction of “self-referential” propositionsi results in contradictions 
[Wittgenstein 1937].64 
 
For example the following paradoxes prove every proposition using “self-
referential” propositions:65 
 Curry’s Paradox [Curry 1941]: Suppose that Ψ:Proposition. 
CurryΨ:Proposition ≡ii  Fix[fΨ ]     
        where  fΨ[Φ:Proposition]:Proposition ≡ Φ├ Ψ 
1)  CurryΨ ⇔ (CurryΨ├  Ψ) 
2) ├  (CurryΨ├  CurryΨ)                          // idempotency 
3) ├  (CurryΨ├  (CurryΨ├ Ψ))                  // substituting 1) into 2) 
4) ├  (CurryΨ├ Ψ)                                   // contraction 
5) ├ CurryΨ                                                                    // substituting 1) into 4) 
6) ├ Ψ                                                                                   // chaining 4) and 5) 
 
 Löb’s Paradox [Löb 1955]:66 Suppose that Ψ:Proposition.  
LöbΨ:Proposition ≡iii Fix[fΨ ]     
        where  fΨ[Φ:Proposition]:Proposition ≡  (├ Φ) ├  Ψ 
1)  LöbΨ ⇔  ((├  LöbΨ) ├ Ψ) 
2) ├  ((├  LöbΨ) ├  LöbΨ)                         // soundness 
3) ├ ((├  LöbΨ) ├  ((├  LöbΨ) ├ Ψ))           // substituting 1) into 2) 
4) ├ ((├ LöbΨ)├Ψ)                               // contraction 
5) ├ LöbΨ                                                                       // substituting 1) into 4) 
6) Ψ                                                                                     // chaining 4) and 5) 
 
Of course, it is completely unacceptable for every proposition to be provable 
and so measures must be taken to prevent this. 
 
  
                                                          
i using fixed point operators exploiting an untyped grammar of mathematical 
sentences 
ii Not allowed in Direct Logic because Fix is not allowed. 
iii Not allowed in Direct Logic because Fix is not allowed.. 
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Berry's Paradox 
Berry’s construction [Russell 1906] can be formalized using: 
 Least[s] is the smallest integer in the nonempty set of integers s 
 Length[s] is length of string s.  
 Characterize[s:StringForPredication, k:ℕ]:Proposition ≡ 
         ∀[x:ℕ]→  s  [x] ⇔ x=k 
                                                               
The above definition  of Characterize is not allowed in  Direct Logic 
because   s  [x] is not a sentence in Direct Logic because s  is not 
TermBooleanσ for some strict type σ. 
 
Consider the following definition: 
    BerryString  ≡    
         "[n:ℕ]→  
                   ∀[s:String]→  
                                Length[s]<1000⇨ Characterize[s, n]"67 
Consider the following set:  
            BerrySet68 ≡ {n:ℕ | Characterize[BerryString, n]} 
Note that if BerrySet existed, then it would not be empty.69 
  
1. BerryNumber70 ≡ Least[BerrySet] 
2. Characterize[BerryString, BerryNumber]71      
3. ∀[x:ℕ]→  BerryString  [x] ⇔ x=BerryNumber72     
4.   BerryString  [BerryNumber] ⇔ BerryNumber=BerryNumber73 
5.   [n:ℕ]→  
           ∀[s:StringForPredication]→  
                 Length[s]<1000 
                        ⇨ Characterize[s, n]   [BerryNumber] 74  
6. ([n:ℕ]→  
      ∀[s:StringForPredication]→  
                Length[s]<100⇨ Characterize[s, n])[BerryNumber] 
7. ∀[s:StringForPredication]→ 
    Length[s]<1000 ⇨Characterize[s, BerryNumber]  
8. Length[BerryString]<1000 
         ⇨Characterize[BerryString, BerryNumber]75 
9. Characterize[BerryString, BerryNumber]76 
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Sociology of Foundations 
 
“Faced with the choice between changing one’s mind and proving that 
there is no need to do so, almost everyone gets busy on the proof.” 
John Kenneth Galbraith [1971 pg. 50] 
 
Max Planck, surveying his own career in his Scientific Autobiography 
[Planck 1949], sadly remarked that ‘a new scientific truth does not 
triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but 
rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation 
grows up that is familiar with it.’ 
[Kuhn 1962] 
Foundations are some ways similar to Complementary Science as defined by 
[Chang 2007]:  
[Complementary science] contributes to scientific knowledge through 
historical and philosophical investigations. [It] asks scientific questions 
that are excluded from current  specialist science. It begins by re-
examining the obvious, by asking why we accept the basic  truths of 
science that have become educated common sense. Because many things 
are protected from questioning and criticism in specialist science, its 
demonstrated effectiveness is also unavoidably accompanied by a degree 
of dogmatism and a narrowness of focus that  can actually result in a loss 
of knowledge. History and philosophy of science in its  “complementary” 
mode can ameliorate this situation. 
 
The inherently social nature of the processes by which principles and 
propositions in logic are produced, disseminated, and established is illustrated 
by the following issues with examples:i 
 
 The formal presentation of a demonstration (proof) has not lead 
automatically to consensus. Formal presentation in print and at several 
different professional meetings of the extraordinarily simple proof in this 
paper have not lead automatically to consensus about the theorem that 
“Mathematics is Consistent”. 
 There has been an absence of universally recognized central logical 
principles. Disputes over the validity of the Principle of Excluded 
Middle led to the development of Intuitionistic Logic, which is an 
alternative to Classical Logic. 
                                                          
i cf. [Rosental 2008] 
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 There are many ways of doing logic. One view of logic is that it is about 
truth; another view is that it is about argumentation (i.e. proofs). 
 Argumentation and propositions have be variously (re-)connected 
and both have been re-used. Church's paradox is that assuming 
theorems of mathematics are computationally enumerable leads to 
contradiction. In this papers, the paradox is transformed into the 
fundamental principle that “Mathematics is Open” (i.e. it is a theorem of 
mathematics that the theorems of mathematics are not computationally 
enumerable) using the argument used in Church's paradox. 
 New technological developments have cast doubts on traditional 
logical principles. The pervasive inconsistency of modern large-scale 
information systems has cast doubt on classical logical principles, e.g., 
Excluded Middle.77 
 Political actions have been taken against views differing from the 
Establishment Philosophers. According to [Kline 1990, p. 32], 
Hippasus was literally thrown overboard by his fellow Pythagoreans 
“…for having produced an element in the universe which denied 
the…doctrine that all phenomena in the universe can be reduced to whole 
numbers and their ratios.” Fearing that he was dying and the influence 
that Brouwer might have after his death, Hilbert firedi Brouwer as an 
associate editor of Mathematische Annalen because of “incompatibility 
of our views on fundamental matters” 78 e.g., Hilbert ridiculed Brouwer 
for challenging the validity of the Principle of Excluded Middle. 
     Establishment Philosophers have often ridiculed dissenting views and 
attempted to limit their distribution by political means.79 Electronic 
archives and repositories that record precedence of scientific publication 
in mathematical logic have censoredii submissions with proofs such as 
those in this article. 
  
                                                          
i in an unlawful way (Einstein, a member of the editorial board, refused to support 
Hilbert's action) 
ii while refusing to provide any justification for the censorship other than 
administrative fiat 
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Appendix 3.  Classical Natural Deduction 
Below are schemas for nested-box-style Natural Deductioni for Classical 
Mathematics:  
 
                                                          
i Evolved from classical natural deduction [Jaśkowski 1934]. See history in Pelletier 
[1999]. 
 
 
        Ψ      i hypothesis
 
           ...
           Φ    i inference   
Ψ⇨Φ        i conclusion   
Ψ               i premise
... 
Ψ⇨Φ       i premise
...
Φ               i conclusion
ΨΦ              i premise
…
Ψ├
 
 Θ              i premise
... 
Φ├
 
 Θ              i premise
...
Θ                    i conclusion
Ψ                i premise
…
ΨΦ         i conclusion
Ψ                 i premise
…
ΨΦ            i premise
…
 
Φ                    i conclusion
(Ψ├ Φ)├
 
(Ψ⇨Φ)
Ψ ├
  
(ΨΦ)
(ΨΦ),  (Ψ├ Θ),  (Φ├ Θ) ├
  
Θ 
Ψ,  (Ψ⇨Φ) ├
  
Φ
 
Ψ,  (ΨΦ) ├
   
Φ
 Introduction  Elimination
 Cases
Ψ                i premise
…
Φ               i premise
...
ΨΦ         i conclusion
ΨΦ        i premise
…
Ψ                i conclusion
…
 
Φ               i conclusion
Ψ, Φ ├
  
(ΨΦ)
 
 (ΨΦ) ├
   
Ψ, Φ
 Introduction  Elimination
(├ Ψ) ⇨
 
Ψ
Soundness
(Φ├
 
Ψ) ⇔
 
(├
 
(Φ├
 
Ψ))
Adequacy 
 
    Ψ                    i hypothesis
 
      ...
     ΦΦ       i inference   
Ψ                      i conclusion   
(Ψ├ (ΦΦ))├
 
Ψ
Proof by Contradiction
⇨ Introduction ⇨ Elimination
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End Notes 
1 [White 1956, Wilder 1968, Rosental 2008] 
2 Formal typed grammars had not yet been invented when Gödel and other 
philosophical logicians weakened the foundations of mathematics so that, 
as expressed, “self-referential” propositions do not infer contradiction. The 
weakened foundations (based on first-order logic) enabled some nice meta-
mathematical theorems to be proved. However, as explained in this article, 
the weakened foundations are cumbersome, unnatural, and unsuitable as the 
mathematical foundation for Computer Science. 
3 Mathematical foundations of Computer Science must be general, rigorous, 
realistic, and as simple as possible. There are a large number of highly 
technical aspects with complicated interdependencies and trade-offs. 
Foundations will be used by humans and computer systems. Contradictions 
in the mathematical foundations of Computer Science cannot be allowed 
and if found must be repaired. 
     Classical mathematics is the subject of this article. In a more general 
context: 
 Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic is for pervasively inconsistent 
theories of practice, e.g., theories for climate modeling and for 
modeling the human brain. 
 Classical Direct Logic can be freely used in theories of Inconsistency 
Robust Direct Logic. See [Hewitt 2010] for discussion of 
Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic. Classical Direct Logic for 
mathematics used in inconsistency robust theories. 
4 Soundness means: 
 A theorem of Mathematics can be used anywhere including in 
inconsistency robust inference 
 A theorem of Mathematics can be used in a step of a sub-proof to 
prove a theorem in Mathematics regardless of the assumptions of the 
sub-proof. 
5 Note that this theorem is very different from the result [Kleene 1938], that 
mathematics can be extended with a proposition asserting its own 
consistency.  
6 Many of today's most prominent philosophers and logicians have cast 
doubt on the correctness of the proof. 
7 The definition of inconsistency, i.e., 
Consistent⇔∃[Ψ:Proposition]→├(ΨΨ) is not about numbers. 
Consistent with the general practice in Computer Science, there is no way 
to identify propositions with integers.  
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8 A prominent logician referee of this article suggested that if the proof is 
accepted then consistency should be made an explicit premise of every 
theorem of classical mathematics! 
9 As shown above, there is a simple proof in Classical Direct Logic that 
Mathematics (├) is consistent. If Classical Direct Logic has a bug, then there 
might also be a proof that Mathematics is inconsistent. Of course, if a such 
a bug is found, then it must be repaired. 
     Fortunately, Classical Direct Logic is simple in the sense that it has just 
one fundamental axiom: 
∀[P:𝐁𝐨𝐨𝐥𝐞𝐚𝐧ℕ]→ Inductive[P]⇨ ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i]  
      where ∀[P:𝐁𝐨𝐨𝐥𝐞𝐚𝐧ℕ]→  
                         Inductive[P] ⇔ (P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i] ⇨P[i+1]) 
   Of course, Classical Direct Logic has machinery in addition the above 
axiom that could also have bugs. 
       The Classical Direct Logic proof that Mathematics (├) is consistent is 
very robust. One explanation is that consistency is built in to the very 
architecture of classical mathematics because it was designed to be 
consistent. Consequently, it is not absurd that there is a simple proof of the 
consistency of Mathematics (├) that does not use all of the machinery of 
Classical Direct Logic. 
       In reaction to paradoxes, philosophers developed the dogma of the 
necessity of strict separation of “object theories” (theories about basic 
mathematical entities such as numbers) and “meta theories” (theories about 
theories). This linguistic separation can be very awkward in Computer 
Science. Consequently, Direct Logic does not have the separation in order 
that some propositions can be more “directly” expressed. For example, 
Direct Logic can use ├├Ψ to express that it is provable that P is provable in 
Mathematics. It turns out in Classical Direct Logic that ├├Ψ holds if and 
only if ├Ψ holds. By using such expressions, Direct Logic contravenes the 
philosophical dogma that the proposition ├├Ψ must be expressed using 
Gödel numbers. 
10 As shown above, there is a simple proof in Classical Direct Logic that 
Mathematics (├) is consistent. If Classical Direct Logic has a bug, then there 
might also be a proof that Mathematics is inconsistent. Of course, if a such 
a bug is found, then it must be repaired. 
    Fortunately, Classical Direct Logic is simple in the sense that it has one 
fundamental axiom: 
    ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→ Inductive[P]⇨ ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i]  
             where ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→ Inductive[P]  
                                                                   ⇔ (P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i] ⇨P[i+1]) 
    Of course, Classical Direct Logic has machinery in addition the above 
axiom that could also have bugs. 
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     The Classical Direct Logic proof that Mathematics (├) is consistent is 
very robust. One explanation is that consistency is built in to the very 
architecture of classical mathematics because it was designed to be 
consistent. 
    In reaction to paradoxes, philosophers developed the dogma of the 
necessity of strict separation of “object theories” (theories about basic 
mathematical entities such as numbers) and “meta theories” (theories about 
theories). This linguistic separation can be very awkward in Computer 
Science. Consequently, Direct Logic does not have the separation in order 
that some propositions can be more “directly” expressed. For example, 
Direct Logic can use ├├Ψ to express that it is provable that P is provable in 
Mathematics. It turns out in Classical Direct Logic that ├├Ψ holds if and 
only if ├Ψ holds. By using such expressions, Direct Logic contravenes the 
philosophical dogma that the proposition ├├Ψ must be expressed using 
Gödel numbers. 
11 Classical Direct Logic is different from [Willard 2007], which developed 
sufficiently weak systems that “self-referential” sentences do not exist. 
12 Subsequent further discussion of Wittgenstein's criticism of Gödel’s results 
has unfortunately misunderstood Wittgenstein. For example, [Berto 2009] 
granted that proof theoretically if P⇔⊬P, then: 
1) ⊢⊬P 
However, the above has proof consequences as follows: 
2) ⊢P because (⊬P)⇔P in 1) above 
3) ⊢⊢P because of 2) above 
4) ⊢P because (⊢P)⇔P in 3) above 
Of course, 2) and 4) are a manifest contradiction in mathematics that has 
been obtained without any additional “‛semantic’ story” that [Berto 2009] 
claimed is required for Wittgenstein's argument that contradiction in 
mathematics “is what comes of making up such [“self-referential”] 
sentences.” [Wittgenstein 1956, p. 51e] 
13 specified by axioms [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889] that characterize them 
up to a unique isomorphism  
14 Consequently there is no need to introduce a special kind of set called a 
“class” that was introduced as a patch for set theory by von Neumann. 
15 The Computational Representation Theorem [Clinger 1981; Hewitt 2006] 
characterizes computation for systems which are closed in the sense that 
they do not receive communications from outside: 
The denotation DenoteS of a closed system S represents all the 
possible behaviors of S as15  
  DenoteS = 𝐥𝐢𝐦𝐢𝐭
𝒊→∞
 ProgressionS
i 
          where  ProgressionSi⇾ ProgressionSi+1 
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In this way, S can be mathematically characterized in terms of all its 
possible behaviors (including those involving unbounded 
nondeterminism). 
The denotations of the Computational Representation Theorem form the 
basis of procedurally checking programs against all their possible 
executions. 
16 This is reminiscent of the Platonic divide (but without the moralizing). 
Gödel thought that “Classes and concepts may, however, also be conceived 
as real objects…existing independently of our definitions and 
constructions.” [Gödel 1944 pg. 456] 
17 Even though English had not yet been invented! 
18 Heuristic: Think of the “elevator bars”  . . . 
T
 around s as “raising” the 
concrete sentence s “up” into the abstract proposition s
T
. The elevator bar 
heuristics are due to Fanya S. Montalvo. 
19 e.g. [Shulman 2012, nLab 2014] 
20 [cf. Church 1934, Kleene 1936] 
21 Zermelo in a 1931 letter to Gödel pointed out that in the mathematical 
theory ℕ, there are uncountably many true but unprovable propositions 
because 
 there are uncountably many true propositions in {x=x | x:Booleanℕ } 
 theorems of ℕ are countable. Consequently, here is some 
x0:Booleanℕ such that  ⊨ℕ x0= x0 and ⊬ℕ  x0= x0. 
22 Let Setsℕ⊔ℝ be the closed mathematical theory with axioms for ℕ, ℝ 
and Setsℕ⊔ℝ in this article with ℕ a subtype of ℝ.  Consequently, 
(├Setsℕ⊔ℝΨ)⇒ ├Ψ.  Theorems of Setsℕ⊔ℝ are computational 
enumerable and it is computationally decidable whether or not a proof is 
correct in Setsℕ⊔ℝ 
      Of course, both of the following hold:  
• ⊬Setsℕ⊔ℝChurchTuringSetsℕ⊔ℝ 
• ⊬Setsℕ⊔ℝChurchTuringSetsℕ⊔ℝ 
23 Consequently, there can cannot be any escape hatch into an unformalized 
“meta-theory.” 
24 The claim also relied on Gödel's “self-referential” proposition. 
25 Formal grammars were invented long after [Gödel 1931]. 
26 emphasis in original 
27 ℕ is the type of Natural Number axiomatized in this article. 
28 type of 2-element list with first element of type σ1 and with 
second element of type σ2 
29 type of term of type σ 
30 if t then 1  else 2 
31 1, … and k  infer 1, …, and n 
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32 if t1 then t2  else t3 
33 Because there is no type restriction, fixed points may be freely 
used to define recursive procedures on expressions. 
34 if t then s1 else s1 
35 [Church 1956; Boolos 1975; Corcoran 1973, 1980]. Also, Classical Direct 
Logic is not a univalent homotopy type theory [Awodey, Pelayo, and 
Warren 2013]. 
36 Setσ is the type of a set of type σ, Setsσ is the type all sets of 
sets over type σ, and Domainσ=σ⊔Setsσ  with the following 
axioms: 
{ }:Setσ                                        i the empty set { } is a set 
∀[x:σ]→  {x}:Setσ                      i a singleton set is a set 
∀[s:Setsσ]→  ⋃s:Setsσ       i all elements of the subsets of a set is a set 
∀[x:σ]→  x{ }                                   i the empty set { } has no elements 
∀[s:Setσ, f:𝛔𝛔] → (Elementwise[f])[s]:Setσ     
                                                               i the function image of a set is a set 
∀[s:Setσ, p:Booleanσ] → s↾p:Setσ  
                                                            i a predicate restriction of a set is a set 
∀[s:Setσ]→ { }s                                    i { } is a subset of every set 
∀[s1,s2:Setσ]→  s1=s2 ⇔(∀[x:σ]→  xs1 ⇔xs2) 
∀[x,y:σ]→  x{y} ⇔x=y 
∀[s1,s2:Setσ]→  s1s2 ⇔ ∀[x:σ]→  xs1 ⇒ xs2 
∀[x:σ; s1,s2:Setσ]→  xs1s2 ⇔ (xs1  xs2) 
∀[x:σ; s1,s2:Setσ]→  xs1s2 ⇔ (xs1  xs2) 
∀[x:Domainσ; s:Setsσ]→ x⋃s ⇔ ∃[s1:Setsσ]→ xs1 s1s 
∀[y:σ; s:Setσ, f:𝛔𝛔] →  y(Elementwise[f])[s] ⇔ ∃[xs] → f[x]=y 
∀[y:σ; s:Setσ, p:Booleanσ]  →    ys↾p ⇔ ys  p[y]  
 
The natural numbers are axiomatised as follows where Successor is the 
successor function: 
 0:ℕ 
 Successor:ℕℕ 
 ∀[i:ℕ]→  Successor[i]≠0 
 ∀[i,j:ℕ]→  Successor[i]= Successor[j] ⇨ i=j 
 ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→  Inductive[P]⇨ ∀[i:ℕ]→  P[i] 
      where ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→   
                        Inductive[P] ⇔ P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ]→  P[i]⇨P[Successor[i]] 
37 I.e., ∄[s:Setsℕ]→  ∀[e:Domainℕ]→  es  ⇔ e:Setsℕ where 
Domainℕ= ℕ⊔Setsℕ   
38 a set is not well founded if and only if it has an infinite  chain 
39 [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889] 
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40 [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889] 
41 ℕ is identified with the type of natural numbers 
42 which can be equivalently expressed as: 
     ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→  Inductive[P]⇨ ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i]=True 
          where   
            ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→  
               Inductive[P] ⇔ (P[0]=True  ∀[i:]→ P[i]=True ⇨P[i+1]=True) 
43 [Dedekind 1888] 
44 ℝ is identified with the type of natural numbers 
45 cf. [Zermelo 1930]. 
46 The Continuum Hypothesis remains an open problem for Direct Logic 
because its set theory is very powerful. The forcing technique used to prove 
the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis for first-order set theory 
[Cohen 1963] does not apply to Direct Logic because of the strong 
induction axiom [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889] used in formalizing the 
natural numbers ℕ. 
        Of course, trivially, 
(⊨DomainℕContinuumHypothesis)(⊨DomainℕContinuumHypothesis) 
where Domainσ=σ⊔Setsσ. 
47 [Wittgenstein in 1937 published in Wittgenstein 1956, p. 50e and p. 51e] 
48 [Wang 1997] pg. 197. 
49 In 1666, England's House of Commons introduced a bill against atheism 
and blasphemy, singling out Hobbes’ Leviathan. Oxford university 
condemned and burnt Leviathan four years after the death of Hobbes in 
1679. 
50 There is no subset of ℝ whose cardinality is strictly between ℕ and ℝ. 
51 [Cohen 2006]  Cohen's proof was a great achievement in spite of the 
weakness of his theorem. 
52 because the computable real numbers are enumerable. 
53 [Zermelo 1930, van Dalen 1998, Ebbinghaus 2007] 
54 First-order theories fall prey to paradoxes like the Löwenheim–Skolem 
theorems (e.g. any first-order theory of the real numbers has a countable 
model). First-order theorists have used the weakness of first-order logic to 
prove results that do not hold in stronger formalisms such as Direct Logic 
[Cohen 1963, Barwise 1985]. 
55 e.g. the theory RealClosedField [Tarski 1951] 
56 i.e. in classical notation:  {P[m]  | m:ℕ} 
57 unique up to isomorphism via a unique isomorphism 
58 Unlike Direct Logic, which is more expressive because propositions are not 
countable. 
59 As pointed out elsewhere in this paper, in the more powerful system of 
Direct Logic, Löb's theorem when generalized to all of mathematics turns  
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   into a paradox because Direct Logic has the Principle of Integrity that in 
mathematics: (⊢)⇨, which does not result in the same proof of 
contradiction because “self-referential” propositions are not allowed in 
Direct Logic. 
60 If the principle were allowed, then PL would be inconsistent because every 
sentence would be provable in PL by Löb's theorem. 
61 [Tarski and Vaught 1957] 
62 Statement of Church's Paradox 
63
 Unfortunately, in formalizing Gödel's proof, [Shankar 1994] and [O'Connor 
2005] followed Gödel in using integers to code “self-referential” sentences 
using fixed points (exploiting an untyped grammar of sentences). According 
to [Cantini 2012]: 
In the twenties and in the early thirties, the orthodox view of logic among 
mathematical logicians was more or less type- or set theoretic. However, 
there was an effort to develop new grand logics as substitutes for the 
logic of Principia Mathematica. These frameworks arose both as attempts 
to recover the simplicity of the type-free approach, as derived from the 
so-called naive comprehension principle, as well as in order to satisfy 
meta-mathematical needs, such as the clarification of fundamental 
concepts underlying the notions of “formal system,” “formalism,” “rule,” 
etc.... 
    However, the theories of Curry and Church were almost immediately 
shown inconsistent in 1934, by Kleene and Rosser, who (essentially) 
proved a version of the Richard paradox (both systems can provably 
enumerate their own provably total definable number theoretic 
functions). The result was triggered by Church himself in 1934, when he 
used the Richard paradox to prove a kind of incompleteness theorem 
(with respect to statements asserting the totality of number theoretic 
functions).... 
    The reason for the inconsistencies was eventually clarified by Curry's 
1941 essay. There he distinguishes two basic completeness notions: a 
system S is deductively complete, if, whenever it derives a proposition B 
from the hypothesis A, then it also derives the implication A⇨B 
(deduction theorem or introduction rule for implication); S is 
combinatorially complete63 if, whenever M is a term of the system 
possibly containing an indeterminate x, there exists a term (Church's 
λ[x]→ M) naming the function of x defined by M. Curry then remarks 
that the paradox of Kleene-Rosser arises because Church's and Curry's 
systems satisfy both kinds of completeness, thus showing that the two 
properties are incompatible. 
64 See Historical Appendix. 
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65 In Direct Logic, fixed points on propositions cannot be shown to be 
propositions and consequently the proofs are not valid for the following 
reason: 
   The fixed point operator cannot be defined using the typed lambda 
calculus:  
  PropToProp ≡ [Proposition]↦Proposition 
   Helper∎[f:PropToProp]:PropToProp ≡  
                                                                    [x:([⍰]↦PropToProp)]→ f[x∎[x]]  
   Fix∎[f:([PropToProp]↦PropToProp)]:PropToProp ≡  
                                                                                     (Helper∎[f])∎[Helper∎[f]] 
The missing strict type ⍰ does not exist. 
66 Recently, [Yanofsky 2013 page 328] has expressed concern about Löb’s 
paradox: 
we must restrict the fixed-point machine in order to avoid proving 
false statements [using Löb's argument]. Such a restriction might 
seem strange because the proof that the fixed-point machine works 
seems applicable to all [functions on sentences in an untyped 
grammar of sentences]. But restrict we must. 
Yanofsky solved the above problem posed by Löb’s paradox using systems 
of logic that are so weak that they cannot abstract their own sentences. 
Unfortunately, such weak systems are inadequate for Computer Science. 
Instead of weakening, Direct Logic adopted the strategy of barring “self-
referential” propositions by using a grammar for sentences that does not 
allow the fixed-point machinery for sentences. 
67 Note that Length[BerryString]<100 
68 Note that BerrySet is not allowed in Direct Logic because Characterize 
is not allowed. 
69 Consider the following definition using ε notation of Hilbert: 
      TrivialCharacterization[k:ℕ] ≡   
       String["[x:ℕ]→  (ε[y:ℕ]→  y=",  
                         IntegerToString[k], 
                          ") =",  
                          IntegerToString[k]] 
Clearly, ∀[k:ℕ]→  Characterize[TrivialCharacterization[k], k]. 
Consequently, Characterize[TrivialCharacterization[0], 0] 
Note that length[TrivialCharacterization[0]]<1000. Thus BerrySet is not 
empty. 
70 Note that BerryNumber is not defined in Direct Logic because 
BerrySet is not defined. 
71 using definition of BerryNumber 
72using definition of Characterize 
73 substituting BerryNumber for x 
74 using definition of BerryString 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
55 
                                                                                                                                        
75 substitution of BerryString for s 
76 Contradicting step 2. 
77 for discussion see [Hewitt 2010] 
78 Hilbert letter to Brouwer, October 1928 
79 e.g. “The problem with such papers [critiquing Establishment doctrine] is 
that casual readers will use them to criticize and maybe stop future funding 
...” [Berenji, et. al., 1994] 
 
